Introduction
Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics manufactur- 
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ers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically accuse only one feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of features, of actual patent infringement. But damages verdicts often do not reflect the relatively small contribution an individual patent makes to an infringing product. One study observed that verdicts in these types of cases average 9.98% of the price of the entire product. While both the courts and commentators have blamed the law of patent damages, the role cognitive biases may play in these outsized damages awards has been understudied. Relying on decision-making concepts from other contexts, we hypothesize that two biases, namely, a saliency bias and anchoring, may be at work in a patent trial. Since the infringing feature is the most salient feature in a patent trial (i.e. the focus of the trial), jurors may tend to overvalue that feature. Moreover, a patentee's irrationally high damages demand may "anchor" the juries to that number. We conducted an online 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment to test whether these biases exist and if so, whether particular debiasing techniques may reduce these biases. In eighteen different scenarios, mock jurors were asked to assess damages for different smartphone features. The three manipulations involved: 1) rotating three features so that they were either the feature-in-suit underlying the plaintiffs' claim or one of the other features the defendant identified as contributing to the smartphone's overall value; 2) changing the jury verdict form so that mock jurors had to evaluate both the feature-in-suit and other features together; and 3) having the defendant explicitly call out the plaintiff for anchoring the jury in an irrationally high number.
The results suggest that some combination of the saliency bias and anchoring were at play when juries assessed damages for all three tested features. However, for the storage feature the results were only significant for the feature's relative rank, not its dollar valuation. That may be because the value of increased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the other two features was not. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced, but did not eliminate, the primary effect of the saliency bias, while the defendant's tactic of exposing the plaintiffs' anchor did not significantly reduce damages. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors resisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing feature and instead assessed damages to punish the defendant.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the problem of large damages in multicomponent patent lawsuits. It explains how commentators have characterized the problem and how courts have sought to address the issue. In both cases, these experts have focused on legal fixes that do not take into account cognitive biases. By taking concepts from various decision-making studies, Part II describes the saliency bias and anchoring generally and then explains how they may operate in patent trials to inflate damages awards. Part II then explores two potential de-biasing techniques. [Vol. 26:1 Part III describes the experiment, which was based on a product mislabeling lawsuit. The defendant mistakenly advertised a single feature that was not present in the smartphone that the plaintiffs purchased. Liability was conceded, and mock jurors only had to decide damages. Although our primary goal was to evaluate how juries determine patent damages, we based our experiment on a products misrepresentation case. The simpler legal requirements in a misrepresentation claim allowed us to rotate different smartphone features between the plaintiffs' case and the defendant's case more easily. The plaintiff would describe the feature-in-suit and request a high damages award. In response, the defendant would minimize the value of the feature-in-suit and would describe several other smartphone features to show that the feature-in-suit only contributed to a small part of the overall value of the smartphone. After mock jurors assessed damages, they were asked to also value the other features that the defendant described. By comparing the value of a feature when it was in the plaintiffs' case with the value of the same feature when it was in the defendant's case, we were able to determine whether saliency and anchoring were operating to increase damage awards. In our second manipulation, we changed the jury verdict form to require mock jurors to assess the value of the feature-in-suit together with other features to determine whether we can take advantage of other heuristics (in this case, a framing effect) to reduce the primary effect of the saliency bias (if any). Finally, in our third manipulation, we tested another debiasing technique. This time the defendant explicitly accuses the plaintiff of asking for irrationally high damages to take advantage of anchoring effects. The theory is that if the mock jurors understand that they may be manipulated, they will be less susceptible to that manipulation.
Part IV then describes our results. Our primary saliency-bias hypothesis was confirmed for two tested features (camera resolution and enhanced security). The values of these features were significantly more valuable when they were part of the plaintiffs' case than when they were part of the defendant's case. However, the findings with respect to a third feature (more storage) were more difficult to interpret. Mock jurors ranked the value of this feature higher when it was part of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, but their monetary valuation did not increase as well. That may be because the value of increased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the other two features was not. Additionally, we had mixed results for our debiasing manipulations. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced damages by less than ten percent, while the defendant's tactic of calling out the anchor did not have any significant effect. Finally, Part IV also examines many of the comments mock jurors made after they rendered their decisions. Interestingly, many juries did not appear to follow the jury instructions. Specifically, some jurors appeared to focus on the defendant's culpability and sought to punish the defendant. In Part V, we discuss the limitations of our study. In 
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Part VI, we explore what our findings mean for real world litigations and suggest additional areas for follow-on research.
I. Outsized Damage Awards
Many technology products today are literally covered by hundreds of thousands of different patents.
1 For example, a smartphone likely has patents on the user interface, the microprocessors, memory chips, communication protocols and even the software that runs on one device. But patent lawsuits typically only involve one of these patents. In a few larger, more complex cases, the plaintiff asserts a few patents. Thus, even if only the most valuable patents make it to trial, we would expect damages awards to be only a relatively small percentage of the overall sales prices of these multicomponent products. But that is not the case. In 2007, Lemley and Shapiro found that reasonable royalty awards for a single component that was part of more complex multicomponent products averaged 9.98%. 2 This number seems particularly high given that the average royalty rate across all types of patents was 13.1% and for integrated product claims, 14.7%. 3 Several more recent high profile cases suggest that the same problems continue to be a problem today. 4 These high damages rates suggest that patent law has been overcompensating patentees in these types of technology cases.
5 Existing legal doctrine has taken the blame. 6 The current test for determining reasonable roy- e should expect to see a more significant reduction in the royalty rate if the system were working as intended.").
6.
Id. ("[I]
t is reasonable to conclude that the legal doctrines designed to make the reasonable royalty track the actual value of the patented contribution are not working, at least not fully.").
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[Vol. 26:1 alties consists of weighing a mind-boggling fifteen Georgia Pacific factors.
7
While two Georgia-Pacific factors reflect the so-called "apportionment" principles-the royalty should only reflect the patent's relative contribution to the overall infringing product-it is unclear how much weight juries give these two factors.
8 Several commentators have argued that the Georgia Pacific test gives juries too much discretion and leads to damages awards that overvalue the patent at issue. 9 To aggravate the problem, the number and complexity of the factors hinders judges from effectively policing jury verdicts. 10 In response to complaints from technology companies, Congress worked on draft legislation to curb damages awards from 2007 to 2010. 11 Yet, at the same time, an unusually activist Federal Circuit argued that legislation was unnecessary and suggested that it could handle any problems in patent damages law.
12
Although Congress eventually amended the patent laws in 2011, damages reform was not part of that legislation, most likely because of a lack of industry consensus.
13 But the Federal Circuit followed through on its promises by issuing several decisions rejecting different types of damages evidence and vacating large damages awards. In 2009, the Federal Circuit threw out a $358 million award against Microsoft in Lucent Technologies v.
7.
Ga.-Pac. Corp 8. Factor 9 discusses the "advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices" and factor 13 the "portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer." Id. 13. In 2011, the American Invents Act was passed, but the proposed damages reforms found in earlier drafts were not included in the final version of the legislation. Id. at 1004. 
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Gateway. 14 The infringing feature was the so-called "date picker" feature, which allowed users to select dates without using a keyboard. 15 The Federal Circuit noted that the date picker was "but a tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program [Outlook] ." 16 The decision identified several problems in the way damages were calculated. One notable flaw was how Lucent's expert effectively used the value of the sale of computers loaded with the software rather than the patented portions of the software to calculate damages. 17 That allowed Lucent to frame their damages request as a comparatively small percentage of the overall sales base. Since sales of the three infringing software products were approximately $8 billion, the 8% that Lucent sought was still $561.9 million. 18 The Federal Circuit rejected Lucent's approach and vacated the damages award. 19 More recent decisions have carried forth this analysis and now insist that royalties adequately apportion damages based on the relative contribution the patent makes. 20 One way the Federal Circuit has sought to prevent patentees from capturing the value of the larger product is to insist that royalties be based on the "smallest salable unit."
21 Patentees can only base sales on a larger more complex product if the patented feature provides the basis for customers' demand for the larger product.
Two years after Lucent Technologies, the Federal Circuit categorically rejected another approach blamed for disproportionately high damages awards: the 25% rule of thumb. In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft, the patent covered a mechanism for combating casual copying by creating a unique registration number used to verify that a particular copy of a program was authorized. 22 25 While the jury did not give Uniloc all that it requested, it did award $388 million. The Federal Circuit rejected the rule of thumb saying that it was "a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation." 26 Legal rules like requiring apportionment, basing royalties on the smallest saleable unit, and rejecting the 25% rule of thumb undoubtedly placed downward pressure on damages in multicomponent cases, but they did not solve the entire problem. Although patent trials are quite rare, there are still unusually high damages awards in multicomponent cases. Apple's clash with Samsung is one prominent example. The jury initially awarded Apple $1.05 billion for Samsung infringing three utility patents and two design patents. 27 However, these patents only covered a small portion of the technology found in Samsung's infringing smartphone and tablets.
28 Through numerous appeals, Samsung has successfully whittled away at the $1 billion award. 29 
23.
Id. at 1300-01.
24.
Id. at 1311.
25.
Id 28. The three utility patents asserted comprised of the '381 patent, the '915 patent, and the '163 patent. The '381 patent is directed to "a software feature known as the 'bounce-back' feature," which is "activated when the user is scrolling through a document displayed on the device. If the user attempts to scroll past the end of the document, an area beyond the edge of the document is displayed to indicate that the user has reached the document's end." Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The '915 patent is directed to the "pinch-to-zoom" gesture, and the '163 patent is directed to the "double-tap-to-zoom" functionality. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The four design patents asserted are the '677 design patent, the '087 design patent, the '305 design patent, and the '889 patent. The '087 and the '677 design patents "are directed to designs that Apple contends are generally embodied in the iPhone . . . . Both patents claim a minimalist design for a rectangular smartphone consisting of a large rectangular display occupying most of the phone's front face." 678 F.3d at 1317. The '305 design patent "claims the ornamental design of the iPhone's graphical user interface, including the arrangement of rows of square icons with rounded corners." 735 F.3d at 1357. The '889 design patent is "directed to the design of a tablet computer" and "depicts a rectangular tablet with a polished reflective surface extending to the edge of the front side of the device." 678 F.3d at 1318. 
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But while courts throw out some disproportionately high damages awards, these decisions do nothing to prevent subsequent juries from issuing similar awards in the future. 30 The problem is one of timing. Courts typically impose limits on damages after the jury issues its verdict. Trial courts can only grant a JMOL (judgment as a matter of law) discarding a damages verdict or remitter after the jury has rendered its verdict. Of course, any appeal to the Federal Circuit takes place even later. But these ex post solutions are inefficient. Both the parties and the trial court expend significant time and resources at trial. If possible, any intervention should help juries arrive at a proper damages verdict in the first instance.
The large number of Georgia Pacific factors complicate this task because it is often easy to find an argument for increased royalties under one of the test's fifteen factors, and it is easy for experts to latch on to the more subjective factors of the test and obfuscate the jury. We hypothesize that as long as attorneys can continue to make colorable arguments supporting an extremely high damages request, that request (i.e. the anchor) will have an unduly high impact on the ultimate verdict. That is because jurors (like everyone) are subject to a wide variety of cognitive biases. One or more of these biases may be at work when juries issue disproportionate damages awards in multicomponent patent cases. We describe our hypotheses in greater detail below.
II. The Psychology of Patent Damages
Beginning with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, social scientists have shown that people make irrational decisions in a wide variety of contexts. 31 That is because they take mental shortcuts called heuristics. Countless works have now identified a variety of forms of cognitive biases. 32 [Vol. 26:1 suggest that two such biases may be at work as juries decide patent damages for multicomponent products.
10
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A. Potential Biases
Saliency Bias
A form of saliency bias may cause juries to overvalue an infringing feature. 34 Saliency bias refers to the fact that individuals are more likely to focus on items or information that are more prominent (and salient) and ignore items and information that are less visible. 35 For example, individuals that have been recently exposed to news about violent crime tend to overestimate the likelihood of a violent crime occurring in that individual's neighborhood. 36 Psychologists have theorized that saliency bias stems from people's limited ability to process information. Since they cannot consider all the relevant facts, they naturally focus on particularly salient information. That information then tends to exert undue influence on the individual's decision-making.
In patent infringement cases involving multicomponent electronic products (e.g. a smartphone or a television), the majority of the trial time naturally focuses on the accused infringing feature. This is true even though a multicomponent product is likely to have thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of other features. 37 Thus, information about the accused feature is 33. Thomas Cotter has discussed how heuristics may affect patent damages and argued that courts should be aware of how these heuristics can affect both the decisions of judges and juries. Thomas 
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particularly salient to the jury's primary task. Jurors must focus on the accused feature to assess whether it infringes the patent. Meanwhile, information about the thousands of other features is not relevant to infringement. The only time the juror is asked to consider these features is when the defendant points out that they also contribute value to the product. Thus, a patent infringement trial may create a context where jurors overvalue the infringing feature.
Anchoring
Another form of cognitive bias called "anchoring" may also cause juries to overvalue an infringing feature. Anchoring generally refers to the observation that an initial number inordinately influences an individual's later numerical determinations. 38 Anchoring effects have previously been demonstrated in the context of both personal injury and punitive damages cases.
39
Numerous studies have confirmed that as the demand increases, so does the award. Indeed, one study's title provocatively suggests that "the more you ask for, the more you get." 40 Of course, attorneys are familiar with this phenomenon and often ask for damages awards far in excess of what they think their case is worth or that the jury will issue. 41 Indeed, one might suspect that is precisely what Apple's attorneys were doing when they asked for a $100 royalty on a $199 smartphone for infringing three graphical user interface patents. 42 The surprisingly simple demonstrative exhibit depicted here was presented during the testimony of Dr. John Hauser, an MIT business school professor and Apple's expert. Although Dr. Hauser testified that his conclusions relied on a sophisticated survey technique called "conjoint analysis," his direct testimony lasted less than three minutes. There was no effort to explain the details of "conjoint analysis." This may have been due to time constraints imposed by the court, or it could have been a tactical decision. Apple's attorneys could have been just trying to anchor the jury in the highest number it could introduce. 43 Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a $1 billion verdict in favor of Apple. 44 In sum, it is these types of inordinately high anchors that may be another factor in disproportionately high damages awards in multicomponent patent lawsuits. 
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To the extent that the biases discussed above distort damages determinations, the judicial system should seek ways to either eliminate or reduce them. We hypothesize how two potential debiasing techniques might work here.
Imposing Frames
Our first proposal takes advantage of the concept of coherence. Studies have proven that people's relative valuations appear orderly. For example, one study showed that while people's estimates of the price of everyday objects were unduly influenced by an irrelevant number (e.g. writing down their social security number), the same subjects performed well when asked which items were more or less expensive. 45 This observation suggests that courts can make jury decision-making more accurate by providing more reference points. 46 Indeed, the debiasing technique of providing more reference points has helped decision makers in other areas of the law, such as workers' compensation and sentencing guidelines. 47 Here, we suggest that juries can create their own reference points. Judges could instruct jurors to value the feature-at-issue simultaneously with the other features of the multicomponent device. Currently, jurors are instructed to determine a value for the infringing feature by itself. 48 As a result, the jury's entire focus is on the infringing feature. By prompting the jurors to value various other features contained in the multicomponent device at the same time, courts might be able to reduce the saliency bias. This approach is reinforced by the principle of coherence. A jury verdict form that forces the jury to simultaneously render decisions on different features necessarily re- 
14
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[Vol. 26:1 quires them to also consider relative valuations. We hypothesize that together these two mechanisms will yield a more accurate valuation for an infringing feature in a multicomponent suit.
In theory, it makes sense to assess the value of a particular feature in the context of determining the value of all the other inputs to the product simultaneously. This approach is consistent with what others have proposed: assessing damages by determining the incremental value of the patented feature. 49 Simultaneous valuation has the added benefit of preventing valuations that lead to unreasonable results -namely, the patent system should not lead to situations where the sum of the parts are larger (at least not substantially larger) than the value of the product as a whole.
In practice, neither courts nor researchers can ask people to look at thousands of features simultaneously. Unless they were heavily invested in the outcome, people do not have the time or patience to carefully perform these tasks. 50 However, having mock jurors evaluate a few features as part of the defendant's case is a closer approximation of the ideal approach than when the feature is valued alone in the plaintiffs' case.
Exposing the Anchor
One of the authors has previously studied potential strategies to respond to anchoring in the context of medical malpractice lawsuits. 51 The study tested three potential strategies a defendant might use against a disproportionately high damages demand: 1) offering a significantly lower anchor (the "counter" condition), 2) not offering an alternative number but critiquing the plaintiffs' request (the "ignore" condition), and 3) using the plaintiffs' high demand to attack the plaintiffs' credibility (the "attack" condi- (2015) (endorsing the incremental value and explicitly excluding switching costs); Taylor infra at note 66 at 95-96 (suggesting that damages based on the value of the patent would be "the amount of money that a user of patented technology can save or otherwise obtain based upon the difference between a world where the patented technology is used and a world where the patented technology is not used.").
50. 
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. 52 Although the study found that countering the plaintiffs' $5,000,000 demand with a significantly lower number ($50,000) was slightly more effective than attacking the demand, the difference was small. Average damages in the counter condition were $200,261 while they were $341,872 in the attack condition. 53 The anchoring effect dominated the three attempts to counter it.
Some scholars have suggested that a different tactic might work: educating jurors about their potential biases. 54 One recent study sought to test this theory in the criminal sentencing context. 55 The experiment tested four potential responses to a prosecutor's anchor (i.e. demand for a long sentence): (1) ignoring, (2) identifying, (3) countering (offering a lower alternative anchor), and (4) identifying and countering. 56 In the two identifying conditions, defense counsel specifically called out the prosecutor for throwing out a "ridiculously high number" and labeled it "a psychological manipulation."
57 Interestingly, identifying anchoring by itself had no effect on sentencing outcomes, but when it was combined with a lower anchor, the defense was able to significantly reduce sentencing outcomes by between 37% and 45%. 58 We sought to determine if the same tactic would be effective in determining damages in a multicomponent patent case.
III. The Experiment
Although our primary subject of interest is assessing how juries decide damages in multicomponent patent cases, our experiment was based on a product mislabeling case rather than a patent infringement case. Our experimental design required us to identify and describe three different features in a multicomponent product and repeatedly switch the context in which mock jurors valued these three features. Thus, in different scenarios, either the plaintiff or the defendant would be explaining the value of any given feature. When discussing features, we sought to use the same arguments re- Id. at 31. The 37% reduction occurred in low anchor condition and the 45% reduction occurred in the high anchor condition. Id.
16
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[Vol. 26:1 gardless of whether that feature was being discussed by the plaintiff or the defendant. Introducing infringement arguments would have frustrated that design because the parties would never discuss whether features not in suit infringed a patent. Thus, the product mislabeling lawsuit gave us the best opportunity to isolate the cognitive biases we were seeking to test.
What follows is a description of the "basic" case that is common to all the different scenarios mock jurors viewed. The case involves the mislabeling of the fictional Ultra smartphone. Both the marketing and actual packaging mistakenly referred to a feature that was not present in smartphones the defendant manufacturer sold. The plaintiffs are the class of consumers that purchased the Ultra smartphone for an average of $489/smartphone. The defendant does not dispute liability. Moreover, both sides agree that the defendant should pay the consumers the difference between the phone as described and the phone as delivered. However, they differ on what that amount is. In pre-testing, mock jurors sought to punish the defendant for its conduct when assessing damages. Consequently, the basic case was revised to include facts that minimized the defendant's blame. The defendant sent accurate instructions to a third-party marketing company that made the mistake. Unfortunately, that party is bankrupt, and the defendant manufacturer has willingly accepting responsibility but is disputing the value of the missing feature.
All the different versions consist of three narrated PowerPoint parts: a judge, the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant's attorney. The presentations were combined and rendered into a single video. 59 A judge introduces the basic dispute and provides short jury instructions after the two sides' arguments. The plaintiff points to various benefits that the promised featureat-issue has and asks the jury to award $99 per smartphone. In response, the defendant downplays the significance of the missing feature-at-issue's benefits and points to all the other features found in the smartphone. As part of this argument, the defendant highlights three particular features found in the smartphone and also briefly mentions a host of other important features that contribute to the value of the smartphone. The defendant's bottom line is that $99 is far too much given the countless number of features in the smartphone, and the defendant suggests that $4.85/smartphone should be sufficient compensation.
60 Just as they would in a real trial, mock jurors were then asked to assess damages by determining the value of the missing feature. But unlike in a real trial, we also asked mock jurors to estimate the value of the other features that the defendant specifically identified as contributing to the value of the smartphone and everything else (i.e., all the un-59.
Each presentation used a different person's voice to help participants distinguish between the different roles of judge, plaintiffs' counsel, and defendant's counsel.
60. While pre-testing the experiment, the defendant suggested that $1.25 should be sufficient compensation. However, several mock jurors suggested that $1.25 was absurdly low. 
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mentioned features) that went into the smartphone. As explained below, these questions were asked in three different ways. The task that our mock jurors were given is substantially similar to what real patent juries must do when they decide damages in a multicomponent case. First, in patent cases, the balance of the case focuses on the infringing feature. Here, the balance of the case focused on the missing feature. Second, the patent plaintiff typically demands a relatively large royalty as a percentage of the overall product. Here, the plaintiffs asked for $99 in damages. Since the smartphone sold for $489, the request was slightly less than 20% of the price of the smartphone. We selected that number because it seemed irrationally high, but still within the range of what a plaintiff might actually request. 61 Third, defendants in patent cases invariably attempt to diminish the value of the infringing feature by pointing to everything else found in the infringing product. The defendant in our case discussed three other particular features that contributed to the value of the smartphone and briefly mentioned several other categories of features as well.
A. The Manipulations
In order to test the cognitive biases and various potential counters described above, manipulations were made in three different dimensions. This allowed us to conduct a 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment with a total of 18 experimental conditions as illustrated in Table 1 . We describe each of the manipulations in more detail below.
Table 1 Experimental Conditions
C a m e r a S t o r a ge Security Ind5/ No Debias 1 7 1 3 Tog5/ No Debias 2 8 1 4 Tog8/ No Debias 3 9 1 5 Ind5/ Debias Anchor 4 1 0 1 6 Tog5/ Debias Anchor 5 1 1 1 7 Tog8/ Debias Anchor 6 1 2 1 8
61.
Since Lemley and Shapiro observed that damages average slightly less than 10% in multicomponent cases, a damages demand reflecting slightly less than 20% of the product's price seemed realistic. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, and accompanying text. Our first manipulation involved three Ultra smartphone features: (A) the camera quality (12-megapixel vs. 8-megapixel), (B) the amount of storage capacity (128 gigabyte vs. 96 gigabyte), and (C) the type of encryption technology (6-key vs. 4-key).
M i c h i g a n T e c h n o l o g y L a w R e v i e w
Early testing of our experiment revealed that some mock jurors thought that the defendant should fix the problem by adding features through a software upgrade. To eliminate this possibility, all the features that were involved in the final experiment were part of the smartphone's hardware. The defendant's presentation also informs the mock jurors that it could not simply substitute a smartphone with the missing feature because the defendant actually did not make such a phone.
In the first version, the misrepresentation related to the type of built-in camera. 62 The packaging and advertising said that the smartphone had a 12-megapixel camera when it really only had an 8-megapixel camera. The plaintiff explains why this feature is beneficial and demands $99/unit. The defendant responds, in part, by pointing to other features to suggest that the smartphone is far more than its camera. Among those features are the large 128 GB storage capacity and the sophisticated 6-key encryption. The defendant argues that $4.85/unit is entirely adequate to compensate the plaintiffs.
In the 2 nd version of this manipulation, we rotate the storage capacity into the plaintiffs' case while rotating the camera feature out of the plaintiffs' case and into the defendant's case. 63 In the 3 rd version, we rotate the 6-key encryption feature into the plaintiffs' case while the defendant discusses the other two features. 64 Since we ask mock jurors to assess damages based on the missing feature and to value the other features as well, we can observe if the value of each feature changes based on the context. Our hypothesis is that mock jurors would assign more value when each feature is the focus of the plaintiffs' lawsuit. That would suggest that a combination of the saliency effect and anchoring is pushing damages upwards.
We selected these three features because they represented a range of different values. Presumably, most customers understand the value of more memory and believe it is useful. Thus, we expected that mock jurors would award slightly higher damages for this feature. However, it was unclear to us that people would think that a 12-megapixel camera was significantly more valuable than an 8-megapixel camera. While almost everyone uses the 62.
Conditions 1-6. 63.
Conditions 7-12. 64.
Conditions 13-18.
Fall 2019]
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camera in their smartphones, most people don't need an extremely highquality image. Thus, we expected mock jurors to award slightly less damages for the less powerful camera. Finally, we thought that so long as the smartphone was password protected, most people would not care about the number of digits comprising the password. Accordingly, we expected damages for the difference between the 6-key password and 4-key password to be nominal. Because only the plaintiff suggested that particular features were worth $99, this manipulation only allowed us to measure the combined effect of any saliency and anchoring biases. While we could have designed an experiment that attempted to isolate the saliency effect from anchoring, we chose a design that more closely approximated how damages are litigated in real cases.
Jury Verdicts (x3)
A second manipulation focused on a potential counter to the anchoring bias. This counter attempted to change the way mock jurors assessed damages. First, our control condition (Independent 5) reflected the way real jurors assess damages. The verdict simply asked the mock juror to assess damages on the feature-in-suit -either the camera, storage, or security feature. The specific instructions told mock jurors to measure damages by comparing the difference between what was promised and what was received. 65 After that task was complete, mock jurors were sent to another page (that did not permit backtracking). This page asked the mock juror to rank the value of the feature-in-suit, the two features that were the subject of defendant's presentation (two of camera, storage, and security that were not the feature-in-suit) as well as improved voice recognition software, and "[t]he combination of everything else in the Ultra Smartphone." They were then asked to assess how valuable the three features and "everything else" were in dollars.
In a second condition (Together 5), we asked the mock jurors to perform all the same tasks in our first condition except we asked them to rank 65 .
This instruction looks much like a patent jury instruction would if it focused on the next best non-infringing alternative, an idea many commentators have endorsed. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2039 ("the danger that reasonable royalties will be set too high in component cases will be sharply reduced if the courts base their estimates of reasonable royalties on an assessment of the value of the patented component in comparison with the next best, noninfringing alternative way to create that component"); Douglas A. 
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[Vol. 26:1 the five items first and then value the five items together (including the feature-in-suit). 66 In scenarios with this condition, the final instruction in the jury verdict form said, "Please tell us what damages you award the plaintiffs as well as what value you attributed to other features of the Ultra smartphone that defendants identified." The feature-in-suit was listed followed by each of the other features identified.
Our third condition (Together 8) was substantially like our second condition. 67 However, three more features that the defendant briefly mentioned were added to the jury verdict form. They were: "the tempered shatter resistant glass", "the user-friendly backup system," and "allowing the smartphone to communicate over wireless networks" (i.e., Wi-Fi).
By asking the jury to assess the value of the other features at the same time they assessed damages for the feature-at-issue, the jury verdict manipulation allowed us to examine whether forcing context on the mock juror's decision making process results in a lower damages award than it otherwise would. Our hypothesis is that mock jurors will place a lower value on the feature-at-issue when valuing all of the features together as compared to valuing the feature-at-issue individually without consideration of the other features not at issue in the case. We also suspect that adding more features to the jury form will increase that effect.
The Defendant's Argument (x2)
To test whether defendants could debias the plaintiffs' anchor with an argument that specifically says the plaintiff is using an anchor, we created two experimental conditions. In the control condition, the defendant said nothing about anchoring. However, in the "Debias Anchor" condition, the defendant smartphone manufacturer argued that: "[t]he plaintiffs are only throwing out the $100 number to anchor your view in this ridiculously high number; it is a well-known psychological manipulation." If the results of previous studies are true, our hypothesis is that mock jurors will return a lower damages award in the trial variants that include the counter-anchor argument as compared to the trial variants that do not include the counteranchor argument.
B. The Mock Jurors
In the summer of 2018, we performed an online 3x3x2 betweensubjects experiment. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online crowd-sourcing marketplace, and each participant was paid 66 .
Conditions 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17. 67.
Conditions 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18.
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$3.00 each. 68 Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 18 experimental conditions. In our initial experiment, we had an implementation issue with four of our experimental conditions. 69 Consequently, we dropped all the data from those four conditions and ran them again. We then combined the two data sets for our analysis. Although this approach means that the randomization was less than ideal, we have no reason to believe that the two populations were systematically different.
Depending on the condition, mock jurors watched a video that lasted between 10 minutes 36 seconds to 14 minutes and 3 seconds. Together 1,059 mock jurors (847 in the first run and 212 in the second run) passed two attention check questions and were allowed to submit a verdict. We then ran a series of quality checks. The quality checks were designed to eliminate mock jurors who did not take the task seriously. First, we disqualified mock jurors that valued too many features as $0 on the theory that they were rushing through the verdict form without really considering the value of all the features. For the Independent5 and Together5 jury verdict forms, we excluded mock jurors that valued three or more at $0. For the Together8 scenario, we excluded mock jurors that valued five or more items at $0. This filter disqualified sixty-eight mock jurors. We also disqualified another four mock jurors that valued the feature-in-suit at $0 on the theory that they were not taking the jury instructions seriously. Finally, we disqualified another fourteen mock jurors who valued any single feature at $489 or above for the same reason, since the entire smartphone itself was valued at $489 (and both plaintiff and defendant stipulated to this fact). This left 973 valid responses.
Of the valid responses, 497 participants identified as female, 474 identified as male, and 2 identified as neither. The sample was younger, more educated, less racially diverse, and more politically liberal than the population 69.
In two cases, we omitted the link to the video and mock jurors assigned to those conditions understandably failed attention checks. In two others conditions, we realized that the jury verdict form did not precisely match those in other conditions. Consequently, we discarded the data from those conditions, reran conditions 8, 9, 11 & 12, and combined the two datasets. While having our respondents divided in non-random fashion is obviously not ideal, we have no reason to believe that the two MTurk respondent pools were systematically different.
22
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70
IV. Results
Although our results were consistent with what Lemley & Shapiro observed for real patent awards, the results of our experiment still surprised us. 71 Given that the average price of the Ultra smartphone was $489, we were struck by the large size of the awards in all the conditions. As shown in Table 2 below, damages for the higher resolution camera (12-megapixel vs. 8-megapixel) were $68.59 (n=308). Damages for the higher storage amount were $57.80 (n=299). As predicted, the lowest damages awards were for the increased security feature (6-digit encryption vs. 4-digit encryption), but they were still $43.49 (n=366).
Given the tens of thousands of features in a smartphone, we were quite surprised that at least some of these numbers weren't much lower. Perhaps the price of the security feature was the most surprising. We attempted to identify both features that consumers valued (i.e. more storage) and those that they did not value at all (i.e. 6-digit passcode vs 4-digit passcode to unlock a smartphone) with the higher resolution camera falling somewhere in the middle. As it turns out, mock jurors viewed the high-resolution camera as the most valuable of the three tested features.
A. Features Are More Valuable in the Plaintiffs' Case
Our first hypothesis is that a combination of saliency bias and anchoring increases damages awards. To test this theory, we compared the damages that mock jurors awarded when the feature was part of the plaintiffs' suit with the value when mock jurors assessed that feature when it was part of the defendant's suit.
For two of the three features (camera and security), the values decreased significantly when they were moved from the plaintiffs' case to the defendant's case. However, for our third feature, storage, we found no effect at all. These results are depicted in Table 2 below. The first column represents the average value of the feature when it was the feature-in-suit (i.e. part of the plaintiffs' case). The second column represents the average value of the same feature when the defendant discussed that feature in order to 70 .
Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: mean and median age 36.33 and 34 years, respectively; 81.4% White, 9.5% African American, 5.3% Asian, 1.4% American Indian, and the remainder classified as Other; 7.8% Hispanic; 51.5% with a bachelor's degree or higher; and 52.2% preferred Democrats, 28.8% preferred Republicans, and 19% had no political preference.
71.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2 at 2032 tbl.1 (observing an average royalty rate of 9.98% for a single component in a larger multicomponent product). 
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minimize the value of the feature-in-suit. Both the first and second columns also contain the number of participants (n) representing that category. The third and fourth columns contain calculations to determine statistical significance using t-tests. The average value of the higher quality camera decreased 13.57%. In absolute terms, that was an $8.94 reduction with a 95% confidence interval that the effect was between -$3.49 and -$14.40. As for percentage of overall value, the average value of the improved security feature had a much larger drop in value, 46.1% which represented a $20.03 decrease. The 95% confidence interval was -$15.23 to -$24.81. In both cases, the results yielded extremely low p values providing a high level of confidence in the findings. Thus, these two comparisons support our hypothesis. Some combination of the saliency bias and anchoring effect cause mock jurors to value the two features higher when it is part of the plaintiffs' lawsuit.
72
However, the results for the storage feature were not consistent with this hypothesis. When the storage feature was at issue, the average damages value was $57.80, whereas the average damages value for the storage feature when it was not at issue was $60.84. Indeed, the minimal difference suggests that the saliency bias and anchoring effect might not be operating in this context. However, we did see an effect when we examined how mock jurors ranked the value of the different features.
72.
We did not perform a regression analysis comparing the feature in suit vs. value when it was not in suit. Such an analysis would require us to use each response three times, once for the feature in suit, and again for each of the other features. The value of the feature in suit and features NOT in suit are related because the total will presumably be close to the value of the entire product, $489. For the results of a standard regression analysis to be reliable, the different outcomes have to be independent. Thus, a regression analysis was not appropriate here.
24
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[Vol. 26:1 After they determined damages, mock jurors were also asked to rank the value of the different features in the smartphone from highest to lowest. In two of the three jury verdict forms (Traditional and Together5), mock jurors ranked five features: the three features of interest (camera, storage, and security) as well as the "newest and most accurate voice recognition software" and "a combination of everything else that went in the [] smartphone." In the Together8 jury verdict, we added three more features for the mock jury to rank. They were: "tempered shatter resistant glass," "user friendly backup system," and "[a]llowing the smartphone to communicate over wireless networks (in other words Wi-Fi)." The results are shown in Table 3 below. 73 The first number shows the average rank for the feature in interest, the second number shows how many features participants were asked to rank in that experimental condition and the third number in parentheticals shows how many valid responses are found in that condition.
Comparing the ranking of the three primary features when they were part of the plaintiffs' lawsuit against their ranking when they were part of the defendant's suit gives us another way to test the combination of saliency and anchoring. In every case, the ranking of the feature was higher when it was part of the plaintiff's case than when it was part of the defendant's case. Moreover, we performed a Wilcoxon rank-sum test that showed that all the results were statistically significant (p < .0001). Notably, unlike our monetary value analysis, the ranking of the storage feature dropped significantly when it was moved from the plaintiffs' case to the defendant's case. These results certainly suggest that mock jurors think about features differently when they are part of the plaintiffs' case as op-
73.
The total number of participants in Table 3 was 951, 23 less than in Table 2 which indicates that 22 mock jurors completed the valuation question and then dropped out before completing the ranking questions. 
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posed to being part of the defendant's case. Oddly, that different perspective does not always affect monetary valuations. We can theorize why the valuation of the storage feature did not change when it moved to the defendant's case. First, the amount of storage may be one of the few features that mock jurors have experience valuing. Smartphones often price different models with different amounts of storage. Although those pricing differences often represent more than storage, mock jurors may not understand that subtlety, or they may simply be using those prices as reference points. Indeed, it is possible that mock jurors did a quick online search to see how storage was priced. In contrast, mock jurors are probably less familiar with the number of megapixels in their smartphone camera, and even if they are, it is unclear how to tease out the price of that feature from different smartphone models. Finally, jurors are probably the least familiar with how much more valuable 6-digit encryption is as compared to 4-digit encryption. In fact, we simply made up this feature believing that mock jurors will attach very little value to it. Thus, it may be that the cognitive biases play a larger role in decision making when individuals have less personal information they can access. Finally, we should note that our results probably underestimate the real size of the saliency/anchoring effect. That is because the plaintiffs' and defendant's valuation arguments were not precisely the same. Specifically, the defendant explained why the feature-in-suit was not valuable. However, there was no counterpart to this argument in the plaintiffs' case. The plaintiff never argued that the "other" features that the defendant discussed were not valuable. If we assume that the defendant's arguments placed some downward pressure on the mock juror's valuations of the feature-in-suit, the value of the features at issue were lower than they otherwise would have been. Of course, we could have omitted the defendant's argument. However, the omission of such an obvious argument has its dangers too. Mock jurors might have interpreted that omission to be a concession that the plaintiffs' arguments were correct. Consequently, we chose to keep the argument. This had the added benefit of making our presentation more realistic.
B. Valuing Multiple Features Together Reduced Damages
Our second hypothesis was that requiring mock jurors to assess multiple features simultaneously would reduce any saliency effect by focusing their attention on the value of other features and forcing to think coherently about the value of different features. In short, we found that our novel jury verdict form reduced damages modestly.
The results of varying the jury verdicts are found in Table 4 . The second column shows the average damages awards relying on the traditional jury verdict form, which simply asks the jury to determine damages for the feature-in-suit. The damages for three features are $68.25 for the higher resolution camera, $61.79 for the additional storage, and $46.95 for the im-proved security feature. The Together5 column provides the average damages for the same features when the jury verdict form asked mock jurors to rank five features and then value those five features together. Damages were uniformly smaller ($66.52 for the camera, $56.96 for storage, and $39.15 for security), but the differences were not large and in fact quite small for the camera, $1.73. Two results stand out. The traditional verdict form yields the highest result for every feature. But there does not appear to be much difference between the Together5 and Together8 verdicts. We performed a regression analysis to see if these differences were significant. In our basic model, the average damages were $69.34 when the traditional verdict was used. 74 The Together5 verdict form decreased damages by $5.04, but the results were not quite statistically significant (p=.09). 75 The Together8 verdict had a slightly larger effect lowering damages by $5.44, but again this effect was not quite statistically significant (p=.08). In an attempt to obtain more statistical power, we combined the results of Together 5 and Together 8. This model predicted that when mock jurors had to value other features together with the feature-in-suit, the together verdict forms lowered damages by $5.44. Presumably because of larger combined sample size, these results were statistically significant (p=.049).
76
In short, we found that changing the jury verdict form to require the jurors to value many features together lowered damages modestly. A superficial look at the descriptive statistics also might suggest that the more fea-
74.
See Table 2 in Appendix A.
75.
See Table 3 in Appendix A. The 95% confidence interval was between -15.9% and +1.4%.
76.
Id. The 95% confidence interval suggested that the together verdict forms reduced damages between -15.1% to -0.03%. 
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tures jurors value, the lower the damages. While that may very well be true, our results say nothing about this hypothesis. Our sample size was too small to determine if differences of these sizes were significant.
C. Exposing the Anchor Had No Effect
Our third hypothesis is that mock jurors would be less susceptive to an anchor if they were expressly told about that bias. Consequently, in half of our scenarios, the defendant accused the plaintiffs of asking for an irrationally high damages number to "anchor" mock jurors around that number.
We found no statistical differences when the defendant explicitly called out the plaintiffs for anchoring. As Table 5 illustrates, when the defendant employed the debiasing technique, average damages decreased between $0.22 and $5.23 depending on the feature at issue. Using t-tests we calculated 95% confidence intervals. All the intervals crossed zero indicating that none of these decreases were statistically significant. Our regression analysis examined conditions for each feature in suit, but it also failed to find a significant effect. In short, we did not find that exposing the plaintiffs' anchor in combination with providing a lower counter anchor reduced damages as compared to simply providing a lower counter anchor.
77
D. Demographics
Before the experiment began, we asked a variety of basic demographic questions. The only area where we found significant demographic effects was in political ideology. Mock jurors were asked to identify their political preference on a seven-point Likert scale: Strong Democrats, Democrats,
77.
See Table 1 in Appendix A. 
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E. Mock Jury Comments
We asked mock jurors to provide written comments about the basis for their decisions and their views on the case. These comments revealed some interesting insights on how mock jurors made their decisions. In particular, their comments revealed a disconnect between the jury instructions and the decisions that at least some mock jurors made.
Both the judge and the jury verdict forms instructed mock jurors to assess damages by determining the difference in value between "what the plaintiffs were promised" and "what they actually received." 80 This instruction was designed to mimic the question that patent cases ask. 81 We were curious whether mock jurors would follow these instructions as they made their damages determinations. Other studies have shown that jurors sometimes do not follow instructions and simply rely on their own intuitions about what is just.
82
To get a sense of what motivated the decision of our mock jurors, we asked them to answer three questions after they filled out the jury verdict
78.
See Table 4 in Appendix A.
79.
See, e.g., Hastie, supra note 39, at 455 ("One other individual difference, political preference, appeared to be related to awards when considered by itself; Republicans set lower awards than mock-jurors with more liberal political orientations (r = +.21, p < .05), although this variable did not enter significantly into the summary linear model.").
80. For example, the jury verdict form for the camera scenario with the traditional verdict form that only asked for the jury to calculate damages said "To determine the plaintiffs' damages, you must determine the difference in value in what the plaintiffs were promised, an Ultra smartphone with a 12-Megapixel camera, and what they actually received, an Ultra smartphone with a 8-Megapixel camera. What damages do you award the plaintiffs for each smartphone they purchased?" The judge gave a similar instruction verbally during his presentation.
81. The Supreme Court has defined patent damages in terms of its compensatory function -that is, "the difference between [ ) (finding that mock jurors "appear quite willing to abandon the jury instructions when they have other rationales for setting punitive damages that they find to be either more convenient or more compelling."). The following responses suggest that many jurors appeared to try to faithfully follow the instructions.
Juror 73
Memory is one of the most expensive upgrades in new phones, market rate is about $100 to go from 64 to 128 GB. So going from 96 to 128 should be about $50.
Juror 704
The difference in price, according to the plaintiff, between a 4-character passcode Ultra smartphone and a 6-character passcode Ultra smartphone is $99. That means plaintiffs should receive the difference in the price between what they paid for what they were getting and what they actually got.
Juror 796 I chose that amount because I felt that was the amount the extra storage was worth. I also chose that amount because I felt customers would have paid less if they knew about the true storage.
However, other mock jurors appeared to ignore the jury instructions and assessed damages based on other factors. Many of these mock jurors focused on the defendant's blameworthy conduct. These mock jurors wanted to either punish the defendant or deter the defendant or others from engaging in this kind of conduct again. The following comments are representative of this view.
Juror 215
Customers chose to buy this phone because it had that security feature which didn't exist. The company misrepresented the phone.
Juror 237 I believe that the damages sustained by the plaintiff are negligible, and that even $5 was perhaps being a bit too generous. There should, however, be some compensation for a falsely advertised feature than [sic] cannot be changed.
Juror 641 Yes, the smartphone has other important features but they intended to mislabel the boxes to mislead their customers, they are untrustworthy and should be punished.
We observed these kinds of punitive responses in pre-testing and modified our basic case to minimize the manufacturer's fault by placing all the blame on a negligent third-party contractor that was now bankrupt. Apparently, this revision was not entirely effective. Some jurors still found sufficient fault with the defendant and apparently calculated damages based on
30
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[Vol. 26:1 blameworthiness. These comments are consistent with the Hans-Reyna gistbased model of decision-making. 83 That model suggests that jurors engage in gist-based reasoning (i.e. damages should be low, medium or high) to determine damage awards. Once they determine damages are warranted, they will make an ordinal gist judgment about the amount of damages that are appropriate (e.g. low or high). 84 As part of that process, jurors will consider the defendant's culpability (e.g. degree of negligence). 85 This is an example of fusion, a process where jurors allow evidence of liability to influence damage decisions or evidence of damages to influence liability decisions. 86 For our purposes, the most relevant studies have found that mock jurors tend to award higher damages when the underlying conduct is more blameworthy. 87 In our case, this appears to be true even when the level of culpability was small.
But the high average damage awards are clearly not entirely attributable to the defendant's bad conduct. If we look back at the first set of comments above, we observe that some mock jurors appeared to faithfully follow the jury instructions and still arrived at substantial damages numbers. Juror 832 . . . . What the defendant suggests is an appropriate reparation (appx $4 and some change) does not seem adequate given the significant different [sic] in storage that was promised; yeah, they didn't intend on falsely advertising their product, but they are ultimately responsible for their product-including managing all parties involved with the marketing of their product. The plaintiffs' demand for $99 also felt excessive because, again, in the actual sense-they got what they paid for. But I also understand they may have chosen a different product if they realized the product was not what it seemed, so I empathize with them on that point. Given that there is some merit to both arguments, I decided to split down the middle (roughly) at $40.
Others have also found that some jurors tend to "split the baby" and make decisions that reflects compromises. 88 This shows one way anchoring can work to increase damages. When a plaintiff asks for an irrationally high number, that will push the mid-point higher. This tactic does work as well for defendants. While a defendant could respond by suggesting an irrationally low damages award, it faces a lower bound, zero. In cases where damages might reasonably be close to zero, the defendant cannot suggest a far lower number.
Still other mock juries considered categories of damages that were not found in the instruction. Specifically, they wanted to compensate the plaintiffs for the inconvenience associated with receiving a phone without all the promised features. Juror 808 I gave them the amount I did ($40) because I figured that was roughly the amount that was fair for the inconvenience of receiving less storage than they originally believed, but wasn't the most important reason for purchasing this phone.
In short, while our experiment has shown that a combination of the saliency and anchoring effects likely increase damages assessments for individual components, our qualitative data suggests there are likely other factors that contribute to high valuations. Jurors may be awarding damages for cat-
88.
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, ContextDependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 287, 301 (1996) (describing two experiments that show that subjects were more like to choose a verdict when it was a compromise between more extreme choices); Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 47, at 2132 ("In the context of pain-and-suffering awards, anchors appear to be especially important . . . Some jurors appear to split the difference between the figures suggested by the plaintiff and the defendant . . . .").
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V. Limitations
First, we tested the combined effect of saliency and anchoring together. In other words, we never isolated either bias individually. We did this consciously in an attempt to make this experiment as realistic as we could. In theory, it would have been possible to isolate the saliency effect by eliminating the patentee's anchor is some experimental conditions. However, that never happens in real cases. The patentee always asks the jury for a specific damages number. Likewise, it would also be possible for the defendant to tell the jury what value the other features (not in suit) were worth. But it would have been unrealistic for the defendant to say that features not in suit were worth $99. A real defendant would undoubtedly have used a much smaller number for each of the other features that contributed value to the smartphone. Comparing the value of a particular feature as it moved between plaintiffs' case and defendant's case under these circumstances would have been unhelpful. Perhaps, in future experiments, subjects could determine the value of features outside the context of a trial in a way that would allow us to test each bias separately. We leave that possibility for the future. But for now, we can only say that saliency and anchoring together increase mock jury valuations.
Second, we asked mock jurors to evaluate the value of different features in the context of a product misrepresentation case instead of a patent case. While there were legitimate logistical reasons for doing so, there are undoubtedly significant differences between these kinds of lawsuits. Indeed, the qualitative comments from our experiment showed that many mock jurors did not just focus on the value of the features at interest. Instead, their damages calculation considered the defendant's culpability, which was unique to the misrepresentation context. We suspect that similar lines of thinking might influence patent juries. While patent juries may be instructed to focus on the value of the infringing feature, they may assess damages by considering why the defendant failed to avoid infringement. More work needs to be done to verify this hypothesis.
Third, we did not discuss the three extra features (tempered glass, backup system, and Wi-Fi/Bluetooth communications) that were part of the Together8 verdict form. Thus, a reason why we may not have seen a significant effect between the Together5 and Together8 verdict forms is because of a lack of saliency of the three extra features in the mock trial. If the defendant had discussed these three extra features in detail (like the defendant did with the other 4 features -camera, storage, security, and voice recognition), then we may have seen a greater allocation of value to those three features, thereby further decreasing the damages award for the feature-at-issue. Fourth, our experiment condensed a trial to roughly ten to fourteen minutes of narrated PowerPoint slides. The respondents were not able to see the attorneys, experts, or judge and witness their body language during the presentation at the trial, which can affect the verdict in many cases. This abbreviated format allowed us to utilize a randomized controlled trial experimental design, which is the gold standard for scientific research. 89 However, there are still reasonable concerns about whether shortening the trial will change the way individuals make decisions.
Fifth, we did not study real jurors. Prior research has shown that "the population of Mechanical Turk is at least as representative of the U.S. population as traditional subject pools."
90 Known experimental results have been replicated using the MTurk population. 91 Nonetheless, MTurkers may be more easily distracted from the trial compared to real jurors and may even provide junk responses (e.g., those who failed to watch the entire video without hearing all the arguments and rendered a verdict). It may be that real jurors are more earnest in their efforts to provide meaningful responses or that real jurors determine liability differently knowing that the outcomes will affect real individuals and companies.
Lastly, our study involved single mock jurors. Consequently, our mock jurors did not deliberate with other jurors as they would do in a real trial. Nonetheless, others have shown that individual juror decisions are quite predictive of jury decisions. Dennis Devine summarized the literature by saying, "[r]esearch has consistently shown a strong and robust relationship between the verdict preferred by the majority of jurors at the start of deliberation and the jury's ultimate verdict." 92 With respect to damages, the work that has been done suggests that individual juror decisions underestimate what juries will decide after deliberation. 93 If this held true for valuing indi-monetary valuation. Modifying the jury verdict form to require mock jurors to assess the value of many features simultaneously reduced damages modestly while the defendant's tactic of exposing the anchor did not. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors resisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing feature and instead assessed damages to punish the defendant. These results are nuanced and cause us to ask as many questions as we answer. Why is saliency and anchoring so powerful with two features, but less effective in another? What other factors are interacting with our findings to enhance or reduce them in particular contexts? Can our findings be replicated with a patent case, particularly with respect to the mock jurors' desire to use damages to punish? We cannot answer these questions now, but hope that this article causes both policymakers and commentators to start thinking more seriously about how the psychology of jury decisionmaking might affect patent damages. It is clearly not enough to lay down a set of well thought out rules if juries will not follow them, albeit unintentionally. To the extent that patent damages in multicomponent cases are irrationally large, much work remains to be done to determine why some juries disagree, much less nudge their decisions downward. Our study shows that revising the jury verdict form only provides limited benefits in this direction. 
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Appendix A Table A1 illustrates the "All Model" where the base case is set at "Camera" when the camera is the feature-at-issue. For example, the average storage damages value was $7.10 less than the average awarded camera damages value. Income (leveled at "less than $10,000") Basic + Framing (isolate Framing effect) Table A2 shows how different jury verdicts affected damages. The base case is the standard jury verdict form, where each respondent valued the feature-at-issue separately, rather than simultaneously with either 5 or 8 other features. Table A2 also contains 95% confidence intervals.
40
M i c h i g a n T e c h n o l o g y L a w R e v i e w
[Vol. 26:1 Table A3 shows the effect on damage values when the defendant accused the plaintiffs of anchoring. The base case is the "no counter" argument, where the plaintiff does not expose the defendant's psychological "anchoring" techniques during the trial. Table A3 also contains 95% confidence intervals. Table A4 illustrates how damages values are affected based on political leanings. The base case is set to the average damages value for respondents who strongly preferred Democrats and where the feature at issue was the security feature. 
Political Regression
